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Abstract. We construct a structure-preserving signature scheme that
is selectively randomizable and works in all types of bilinear groups.
We give matching lower bounds showing that our structure-preserving
signature scheme is optimal with respect to both signature size and public
verification key size.
State of the art structure-preserving signatures in the asymmetric setting
consist of 3 group elements, which is known to be optimal. Our construc-
tion preserves the signature size of 3 group elements and also at the same
time minimizes the verification key size to 1 group element.
Depending on the application, it is sometimes desirable to have strong
unforgeability and in other situations desirable to have randomizable
signatures. To get the best of both worlds, we introduce the notion of
selective randomizability where the signer may for specific signatures
provide randomization tokens that enable randomization.
Our structure-preserving signature scheme unifies the different pairing-
based settings since it can be instantiated in both symmetric and asym-
metric groups. Since previously optimal structure-preserving signatures
had only been constructed in asymmetric bilinear groups this closes an
important gap in our knowledge. Having a unified signature scheme that
works in all types of bilinear groups is not just conceptually nice but also
gives a hedge against future cryptanalytic attacks. An instantiation of our
signature scheme in an asymmetric bilinear group may remain secure even
if cryptanalysts later discover an efficiently computable homomorphism
between the source groups.
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1 Introduction
Structure-preserving signatures [3] (SPS) are signatures defined over groups with
a bilinear pairing where messages, signatures and public verification keys all
consist of group elements and the verification algorithm evaluates verification
equations consisting of products of pairings of these group elements. Based on
such signatures, one can easily design modular cryptographic protocols with
reasonable efficiency, in particular in combination with non-interactive zero-
knowledge (NIZK) proofs of knowledge about group elements [21]. Numerous
applications of SPS, including blind signatures [3, 17], group signatures [3, 17, 25],
homomorphic signatures [24, 9], delegatable anonymous credentials [16], compact
verifiable shuﬄes [14], network encoding [8], oblivious transfer [19, 12], tightly
secure encryption [22, 2], anonymous e-cash [26], etc., have been presented in the
literature.
1.1 Symmetric and asymmetric bilinear pairings
Bilinear pairing groups are usually instantiated as groups of points of certain
restricted families of elliptic curves (or more rarely, other abelian varieties),
and can be broadly classified into several types [18] according to the efficient
morphisms that exist between the cyclic groups of prime order G1, G2 associated
with the bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GT . The two most important ones are
Type I pairings, where G1 = G2, and Type III pairings defined as the ones that
do not have an efficiently computable isomorphism between G1 and G2 in either
direction. Type II parings, like Type III pairings, have G1 6= G2 but with an
efficiently computable isomorphism from one group to the other. We will also
refer to Type I pairings as symmetric bilinear groups because G1 = G2 and refer
to other types types of pairings where G1 6= G2 as asymmetric bilinear groups.
Type I, or symmetric, pairings are obtained from supersingular curves,
and have traditionally had an efficiency edge in implementations on resource-
constrained devices, although recent advances on the discrete logarithm problem
over finite fields of small characteristic [10] call this into question (large character-
istic Type I pairings remain secure, but they are not as efficient). Pairing-based
protocol designers often present their schemes in the symmetric setting, as
protocol descriptions and security arguments tend to be simpler.
Type III pairings, which are the more efficient kind of asymmetric pairings, are
obtained from special families of ordinary curves, and tend to be more compact,
faster at least in software, and support stronger and more compact hardness
assumptions such as the DDH assumption in their source groups. Thus, Type III
pairings are often preferred for practical purposes. However, certain protocol
descriptions given in the symmetric setting do not easily translate to the Type III
setting.
1.2 Unified structure-preserving signatures
Since SPS are a relatively low-level building block, their efficiency is of crucial
importance. That efficiency is usually measured in terms of the number of group
elements in signatures and the number of verification equations, and a significant
amount of research has been devoted to obtaining lower and upper bounds with
respect to these measures. Abe et al. [4] gave a construction of an SPS with 3
group element signatures and 2 verification equations using Type III bilinear
groups. They also gave a matching lower bound in Type III bilinear groups of 3
group elements for signatures and 2 verification equations, which showed that the
construction is optimal with respect to signature size and verification complexity.
In contrast to the work on Type III pairings, very little is known about
SPS over symmetric bilinear groups. The best known construction for Type I
pairings has signatures with 7 group elements, and no non-trivial lower bounds
or more efficient constructions have been proposed to date. One could hope that
symmetric functions such as e(X,X) that are only possible in Type I pairings
would make more efficient designs possible. Besides, it seems plausible that having
only one group in the symmetric case admits lower complexity than separately
handling two groups as must be done in the asymmetric case. On the other hand,
the ability to use elements as the input in either side of the pairing may give the
adversary additional flexibility and cause additional vulnerabilities. So it is not a
priori clear whether symmetric pairings are advantageous for designers or for
attackers.
We answer this question in a strong sense by providing a unified structure-
preserving signature scheme that works in all types of bilinear groups. The design
of the scheme does not exploit any symmetry or maps between the source groups
and can therefore be instantiated in any type of bilinear group. At the same time
though, it is resistant to adversaries that are allowed to exploit symmetry. Our
signature scheme has 3 group element signatures and 2 verification equations and
is therefore optimal with respect to Type III pairings. We will also show similar
lower bounds hold for Type I pairings and the scheme is therefore also optimal
in the symmetric setting.
Designing unified structure-preserving schemes that can be used in either type
of bilinear group is of course conceptually appealing since it is simpler than having
separate schemes for each setting. Unified signature may also be more resistant
to cryptanalysis. Currently Type III pairings are the most efficient but building
cryptographic schemes in this setting may leave us vulnerable if cryptanalysts
find an efficiently computable homomorphism between G1 and G2. However,
if we use a unified structure-preserving signature we can even resist attacks
where the adversary has an isomorphism between G1 and G2 that is efficiently
computable in both directions. It is a fascinating question whether there are
other cryptographic tasks for which we can construct unified structure-preserving
schemes without sacrificing efficiency.
1.3 Minimal verification keys
An important efficiency measure that has not received much attention in the
literature on structure-preserving signatures is the size of the public verification
key. For applications that involve certification chains the public key size is of
high importance. If the size of the public key exceeds the size of the messages
the signature scheme can handle, it becomes difficult and cumbersome to build
certification chains and in the world of structure-preserving signatures it is not
possible to use collision-resistant hash-functions to reduce the size of the messages
since such hash-functions destroy the structure we are trying to preserve.
Abe et al. [4] considered only the size of the signatures and the number of
verification equations but did not try to minimize the size of the public key. To
sign a single group element they have a structure-preserving signature scheme
with strong existential unforgeability where the public key consists of 3 group
elements and a randomizable signature scheme where the public key consists of
2 group elements. This means that their schemes cannot easily be used to sign
public keys. There are generic methods to extend the message space of SPS [7]
but they incur a significant overhead so it is preferable to have an atomic scheme
that can be used to sign verification keys.
Fuchsbauer [15, 3] defined an automorphic signature scheme as a structure-
preserving signature scheme where the verification keys belong to the message
space itself. This makes certification chains easy and cheap to construct and
indeed automorphic signatures have been used in the construction of anonymous
delegatable credentials [15, 16]. Current automorphic signatures, however, are
more expensive than the most efficient structure-preserving signatures. The
scheme in [3] has verification keys that consist of 2 group elements, the signatures
consist of 5 group elements and the scheme uses 3 verification equations.
In contrast to these works, we also minimize the size of the verification key.
As in the first construction of automorphic signatures [15, 3], we allow the setup
to include some random group elements in the public parameters describing the
bilinear group to help shortening the verification key. In our case, we assume
that a bilinear group has been generated and a random group element X is
included in these parameters. With this type of setup, it is possible to get a
public verification key that consists of just one single group element.
If the signer runs the setup algorithm, she is ensured that the setup is correct.
However, even if the signer uses a pre-existing setup it is a moderate trust
assumption since we do not need to trust anybody to store any secret trapdoors
associated with the setup; it is for instance not necessary for the signer to know
the discrete logarithm of X in our scheme. If the setup is generated by a trusted
third party, we therefore only need to assume the trusted third party is honest at
the particular time it is generating the setup without storing a secret trapdoor
at that point in time. Alternatively, we may sample the setup in an oblivious
manner from a trusted source of random bits such as a multi-party coin-flipping
protocol or extract it from a physical source of randomness, e.g., solar activity in
a given time interval.
With a single group element as verification key, it becomes easy to build
certification chains. In the symmetric setting, we get an automorphic signature
scheme where the verification key space is identical to the message space. In
Type III pairings, our construction is not automorphic because the message and
the verification key belong to different groups. However, it is easy to create a
certification ladder where we use a verification key in G2 to certify a verification
key in G1, which can then be used to certify a verification key in G2, etc.
1.4 Selective randomizability
We introduce a new feature called selective randomizability that allows a strongly
unforgeable signature to be randomized with the help of a randomization token.
Selective randomizability reconciles the notions of strong unforgeability, where it
is impossible to create new signatures on signed messages, and randomizability,
where it is possible to randomize signatures. Depending on the application, differ-
ent parties may hold randomization tokens corresponding to certain signatures
and they may randomize the signatures, while other parties cannot randomize
the signatures.
Randomizability is useful in reducing the size of the proofs when the SPS
is combined with the Groth-Sahai proof system since a part of a randomized
signature can be shown in the clear. There are other applications and theoretical
results on (not selectively) randomizable signatures in the literature, e.g. [27, 23].
Selective randomizability may also have uses on its own; a selectively randomizable
signature can for instance be used as a service token. Fee paying users get a
signature on the time period they have paid for and a randomization token and
can in each use reveal a fresh randomized signature. Fraudsters on the other
hand do not know the randomization tokens and cannot modify the signatures
and can therefore only copy previous signatures.
We show that our structure-preserving signature scheme is selectively ran-
domizable. Our randomization tokens consist of a single group element, so also
here we achieve minimal size.
1.5 Related work
Abe et al. [3] first used the term structure-preserving signatures but there are
earlier works in the area. Groth [20] proposed the first structure-preserving
signature but the construction involves hundreds of group elements and is not
practical. Green and Hohenberger [19] gave a structure-preserving signature
scheme, which is secure against random message attack, but is not known to be
secure against adaptive chosen message attack. Cathalo, Libert and Yung [13]
constructed a signature scheme that structure-preserving in a relaxed sense that
permits the verification key to include target group elements.
Abe et al. [4] showed that structure-preserving signatures in Type III bilinear
groups require at least 3 group elements and 2 verification equations. They also
gave structure-preserving signatures matching those bounds that are secure in
the generic group model. Abe et al. [5] later showed 3 element signatures cannot
be proven secure under a non-interactive assumption using black-box reductions,
so strong assumptions are needed to get optimal efficiency.
Hofheinz and Jager [22] and Abe et al. [1, 2] investigated the possibility
of basing structure-preserving signatures on standard assumptions. They give
structure-preserving signatures based on the decision linear (DLIN) assumption.
Scheme Signature Ver. key Equations Type Assumption Notes
[20] Many Many Many I DLIN
[13] 11 11 9 I HSDH, FlexDH, S2D ∗1
[3] 7 13 2 Any SFP ∗2
[15, 3] 5 2 3 Any ADH-SDH, AWF-CDH ∗3
[4] 4 4 2 III Non-interactive ∗1
[4] 3 3 2 III Interactive ∗1
[4] 3 2 2 III Interactive ∗2
[1] 17 27 9 I DLIN
[1] 11 21 5 III SXDH, XDLIN
[2] 14 22 7 I DLIN
Ours 3 1 2 Any Interactive ∗4
Table 1. Comparison of structure-preserving signatures on a single group element. ∗1:
Strongly unforgeable. ∗2: Randomizable. ∗3: Automorphic. ∗4: Selectively Randomizable.
The use of a nice security assumption, however, comes at the price of reducing
efficiency.
1.6 Our contributions
We construct a selectively randomizable structure-preserving signature scheme
with message space M = G1, where a verification key is 1 group element, a
signature is 3 group elements and the verifier uses 2 verification equations to
verify the signature. The setup for the signature scheme consists of the description
of a bilinear group and a single random group element. Our signature scheme is
unified, i.e., it can be used in both symmetric and asymmetric bilinear groups.
We prove our signature scheme secure in the generic group model. The
security of the signature scheme can therefore be viewed as an interactive security
assumption. However, as shown by Abe et al. [7] it is impossible to base the
security of structure-preserving signature schemes with 3 group element signatures
on non-interactive intractability assumptions using black-box reductions, so at
least in the Type III setting we could not hope to base security on a non-
interactive assumption. On the positive side, being unified provides a hedge
against cryptanalytic attacks. Even if cryptanalysts uncover efficiently computable
homomorphisms between G1 and G2, our structure-preserving signature scheme
may remain secure.
Table 1 compares our results to previous work on structure-preserving sig-
natures in the symmetric and asymmetric settings. We only consider the case
of a single group element and in the table we therefore compare all schemes
on the same terms, i.e., the cost for signing a single group element, with the
exception of Fuchsbauer’s automorphic signature scheme, which is tailored to
sign Diffie-Hellman pairs of group elements.
To complement our signature scheme, we provide the first analysis of lower
bounds in the symmetric setting. We demonstrate that in the symmetric setting
a signature must be at least 3 group elements and the verifier must use at least
2 verification equations. This matches the Type III setting previously analyzed
in [4] and shows that our signature scheme is optimal also in symmetric bilinear
groups.
Interestingly it turns out that in the case of one-time signatures there is
actually a difference between Type I and Type III pairings. While it is known that
Type III pairings admit one-time signatures with a single verification equation,
we show this is not the case for Type I pairings. The lower bound of 2 verification
equations also applies to one-time signatures.
The lower bound of 3 group elements for the size of signatures does not apply
though. We demonstrate this by constructing a one-time signature scheme in
the symmetric setting with 2 group element signatures. We also analyze one-
time signatures with respect to the size of the verification key. We show that
both Type I and Type III pairings have structure-preserving one-time signature
schemes with 1 group element verification keys.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear groups
Let G be a bilinear group generator that returns (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G,H)← G(1k)
given security parameter k with the following properties:
– G1,G2,GT are groups of prime order p
– e : G1×G2 → GT is a bilinear map s.t. e(Ga, Hb) = e(G,H)ab for all a, b ∈ Z
– G generates G1, H generates G2, and e(G,H) generates GT
– There are efficient algorithms for computing group operations, evaluating
the bilinear map, comparing group elements and deciding membership of the
groups
Bilinear groups can be classified in the three types according to the efficient
morphisms that exist between the source groups G1 and G2. Type I pairings
have G1 = G2 and G = H. Type II pairings have an efficiently computable
isomorphism from one source group to the other but none in the reverse direction.
Type III pairings have no efficiently computable isomorphism from either source
group to the other.
2.2 Generic algorithms
In a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G,H) generated by G we refer to deciding
group membership, computing group operations in G1, G2 or GT , comparing
group elements and evaluating the bilinear map as the generic group operations.
The signature schemes we construct only use generic group operations.
As a matter of notation, we will use capital letters G,H,M,R, S, T, U, V,W
for group elements in G1 and G2. We will use small letters 1,m, r, s, t, u, v, w for
the corresponding discrete logarithms of group elements with respect to base G
or H.
2.3 Setup
Our signature schemes work over a bilinear group generated by G. This group
may be generated by the signer and included in the public verification key. In
many cryptographic schemes it is convenient for the signer to work on top of a
pre-existing bilinear group though. We will therefore in the description of our
signatures explicitly distinguish between a setup algorithm P that produces a
public parameter PP and a key generation algorithm the signer uses to generate
her own keys.
The setup algorithms we use generate a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G,H)←
G(1k). They may then extend the description of the bilinear group with addi-
tional random group elements. As discussed in Sect. 1.3 this is a moderate setup
assumption since the signer does not need to know the discrete logarithms of the
random group elements. The group elements may therefore be sampled obliviously
without learning the discrete logarithms or the discrete logarithms may be erased
immediately upon generation.
2.4 Secure signature schemes
A digital signature scheme (with setup algorithm P) is a quadruple of efficient
algorithms (P,K,S,V). The setup algorithm P takes the security parameter and
outputs a public parameter PP . The key generation algorithm K takes PP as
input and returns a public verification key V K and a secret signing key SK. We
will always assume that V K includes PP and that SK includes V K. The signing
algorithm S takes a signing key SK and a message M in the message space M
defined by PP and V K as input and returns a signature Σ. The verification
algorithm V takes the verification key V K, a message M and the signature Σ
and returns either 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
Definition 1 (Correctness). We say the signature scheme (P,K,S,V) is (per-
fectly) correct if for all security parameters k ∈ N
Pr

PP ← P(1k)
(V K, SK)← K(PP)
M ←M
Σ ← SSK(M)
: VV K(M,Σ) = 1
 = 1.
A signature scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable if it is hard to forge
a signature on a new message that has not been signed before. The adversary
may see signatures on other messages before making the forgery. We distinguish
between a random message attack (RMA), where the adversary gets pairs of
random messages and corresponding signatures, and an adaptive chosen message
attack (CMA) where the adversary can choose arbitrary messages and receive
signatures on them. Our signatures will be existentially unforgeable against the
strong adaptive chosen message attack, but our lower bounds on the complexity
of signature schemes will hold even for the weaker random message attacks.
We now formally define existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen
message attack.
Definition 2 (EUF-CMA). A signature scheme (P,K,S,V) is existentially un-
forgeable under adaptive chosen message attack if for all non-uniform polynomial
time A
Pr
PP ← P(1k)(V K, SK)← K(PP)
(M,Σ)← ASSK(·)(V K)
: M /∈ Q ∧ VV K(M,Σ) = 1
 = negl(k),
where Q is the set of queries made by A to the signing oracle.
Sometimes it is also useful to prevent the adversary from issuing a new
signature for a message that has already been signed. A signature scheme is
strongly existentially unforgeable if it is hard to find a signature on a message
that has not been signed before and also hard to find a new signature for a
message that has already been signed. This notion, denoted by sEUF-CMA, is
formally captured in the same way as the definition of EUF-CMA except for
additionally requiring (M,Σ) /∈ Q where Q is the set of message-signature pairs
from A’s queries to the signing oracle.
We get the definition for existential unforgeability against random message
attack (EUF-RMA) by modifying the signing oracle to picking M ←M at random,
computing Σ ← SSK(M) and returning (M,Σ) to the adversary whenever the
signing oracle is queried.
Corresponding security notions for one-time signature schemes can be obtained
by restricting the adversary to only calling the signing oracle once in the above
definitions.
2.5 Selectively randomizable signatures
Some applications require signatures to be strongly unforgeable, while in other
applications it is desirable that a signature on a message can be randomized into
a new random signature on the same message. A randomizable signature scheme
can only be EUF-CMA secure though since a randomized signature would violate
sEUF-CMA security. In order to reconcile the two notions and get the best of
both worlds, we define the notion of selective randomizability where the signer
can select to make specific signatures randomizable by providing randomization
tokens for them.
In a selectively randomizable signature scheme the signing algorithm returns
both a signature and a randomization token. Furthermore, there is a randomiza-
tion algorithmR that given a message, signature and randomization token returns
a random signature on the message. We require that the randomization algorithm
R given a message M , signature Σ and corresponding randomization token W
computes a signature Σ′ ← RV K(M,Σ,W ) such that for all correctly generated
inputs RV K(M,Σ,W ) and SSK(M) have identical probability distributions.
Since the signatures are randomizable it is not possible to have strong ex-
istential unforgeability if the randomization tokens are given to the adversary.
However, we can get strong existential unforgeability for signatures on messages
for which the adversary does not have randomization tokens. Formally we define
security against a chosen message and token attack (CMA-TA) as follows.
Definition 3 (sEUF-CMA-TA). A selectively randomizable signature scheme
(P,K,S,R,V) is strongly existentially unforgeable under chosen message and
token attack if for all non-uniform polynomial time A
Pr
PP ← P(1k)(V K, SK)← K(PP)
(M,Σ)← ASSK(·),StSK(·)(V K)
:
(M,Σ) /∈ Q
M /∈ Qt
VV K(M,Σ) = 1
 = negl(k),
where S is a signing oracle that is given a message and returns a signature on the
message, St is a token-signing oracle that is given a message and returns both a
signature and a randomization token, Q is the set of messages and signatures
observed by the signing oracle, and Qt is the set of messages observed by the
token-signing oracle.
Please observe that A can send M to S and St an arbitrary number of times to
get (random) signatures on M so we do not need to provide the adversary with
a randomization oracle in the security definition.
2.6 Structure-preserving signature schemes
We study structure-preserving signature schemes [3] on bilinear groups generated
by group generator G. In a structure preserving signature scheme the verification
key, the messages and the signatures consist only of group elements from G1
and G2 and the verification algorithm evaluates the signature by deciding group
membership of elements in the signature and by evaluating pairing product
equations, which are equations of the form∏
i
∏
j
e(Xi, Yj)
aij = 1,
where X1, X2, . . . ∈ G1, Y1, Y2, . . . ∈ G2 are group elements appearing in PP , V K,
M and Σ and a11, a12, . . . ∈ Zp are constants stored in PP . Structure-preserving
signatures are extremely versatile because they mix well with other pairing-based
protocols. Groth-Sahai proofs [21] are for instance designed with pairing product
equations in mind and can therefore easily be applied to structure-preserving
signatures.
Definition 4 (Structure-preserving signatures). A digital signature scheme
(P,K,S,V) is said to be structure preserving over bilinear group generator G if
– PP includes a bilinear group (p,G1,G2,GT , e,G,H) generated by G, and
constants in Zp,
– the verification key consists of PP and group elements in G1 and G2,
– the messages consist of group elements in G1 and G2,
– the signatures consist of group elements in G1 and G2, and
– the verification algorithm only needs to decide membership in G1 and G2 and
evaluate pairing product equations.
When proving our lower bounds, we will relax the above definition to allow
arbitrary target group elements Z ∈ GT to be included in the verification key and
to appear in the verification equations. This gives the strongest possible results:
our lower bounds hold in a relaxed model of structure-preserving signatures and
our constructions of signatures satisfy the strict model of structure-preserving
signatures.
Generic signer. Abe et al. [3] did not explicitly require the signing algorithm
to only use generic group operations when they defined structure-preserving
signatures. However, all existing structure-preserving signatures in the literature
have generic signing algorithms and we believe it would be a surprising result
in itself to construct a structure-preserving signature with a non-generic signer.
Our constructions have generic signer algorithms and some of our lower bounds
will assume the signer is generic.
3 Selectively Randomizable Structure-Preserving
Signatures
Fig. 1 gives a selectively randomizable structure-preserving signature scheme
with 1 element verification keys, 3 group element signatures and 2 verification
equations. The signature scheme is sEUF-CMA-TA secure. The lower bounds in
[4] and Sect. 5 show that this construction is optimal with respect to size and
verification complexity in both Type I and Type III bilinear groups.
Setup P(1k): Run (p,G1,G2,GT , e, G,H) ← G(1k), pick X ← G1, and return
PP = (p,G1,G2,GT , e, G,X,H).
Key generation K(PP): Choose v ← Zp, compute V ← Hv, and return
V K = (PP , V ) and SK = (PP , v).
Signing SSK(M): On M ∈ G1 choose r ← Z∗p and compute signature Σ =
(R,S, T ) and randomization token W as:
R← Hr, S ←M vrX 1r , T ← S vrG 1r , W ← G 1r .
Randomization RVK(M, (R,S, T ),W ): Pick α← Z∗p and compute the random-
ized signature Σ′ = (R′, S′, T ′) given by:
R′ ← R 1α , S′ ← Sα, T ′ ← Tα2Wα(1−α).
Verification VVK(M, (R,S, T )): Accept if and only if M,S, T ∈ G1, R ∈ G2 and
e(S,R) = e(M,V )e(X,H) and e(T,R) = e(S, V )e(G,H).
Fig. 1. Minimal structure-preserving signature scheme.
Randomized signatures are perfectly indistinguishable from real signatures
since both types of signatures are uniquely determined by the uniformly random
non-trivial group element R. Somebody who has a signature on a particular
message and a corresponding randomization token can create as many uniformly
random signatures on the message as she wants. An additional feature is that
the randomization token can also be randomized together with the signature by
computing W ′ ←Wα, so the power to randomize can be delegated to others.
The signature scheme is designed with Groth-Sahai proofs in mind. If we
have a secret randomization token and use it to randomize a signature, we may
reveal the random group element R without this leaking any information about
the message or the original signature from which the randomized signature was
derived. When R is public both verification equations become linear, which makes
Groth-Sahai proofs very efficient.
We will now prove that the signature scheme with selective randomization
is sEUF-CMA-TA secure. This implies as two special cases that the signature in
Fig. 1 is EUF-CMA secure even when all randomization tokens are revealed and
sEUF-CMA secure if no randomization tokens are revealed.
Theorem 1. The signature scheme in Fig. 1 is sEUF-CMA-TA secure in the
generic group model.
Proof. We will without loss of generality show that the signature scheme is
sEUF-CMA-TA secure in the symmetric setting where G1 = G2 since this setting
gives the adversary the most degrees of freedom and hence the best chance of
breaking the scheme. Moreover, the scheme is secure in the generic group model
even if the discrete logarithm logG(H) is known to the adversary and we will
therefore without loss of generality assume H = G.
A generic adversary only uses generic group operations. This means that in G1
it can only compute linear combinations of group elements from the verification
key and the signatures it has seen. Linear combinations on verification key
elements and signature elements correspond to formal Laurent polynomials (of
degree ranging from −2q to 2q + 1 after q signature queries) in the discrete
logarithms of the group elements. We will show that no linear combinations
produce formal Laurent polynomials corresponding to a forgery. By the master
theorem in [11] this means that the signature scheme is secure in the generic
group model.
The group elements in V K are G,X, V with corresponding discrete logarithms
1, x, v. On a query Mi with discrete logarithm mi from the adversary, the signature
oracle responds with a signature (Ri, Si, Ti) and possibly a rerandomization token
Wi with discrete logarithms
ri ← Z∗p si =
miv
ri
+
x
ri
ti =
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
wi =
1
ri
.
Suppose the adversary after q queries constructs (M,R, S, T ). Since the
adversary is generic it can only construct m, r, s, t that are linear combinations
of 1, x, v, r1, s1, t1, w1, . . . , rq, sq, tq, wq, i.e.,
m =µ+ µxx+ µvv +
q∑
i=1
[
µriri + µsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + µti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + µwi
1
ri
]
r =ρ+ ρxx+ ρvv +
q∑
i=1
[
ρriri + ρsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + ρti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + ρwi
1
ri
]
s =σ + σxx+ σvv +
q∑
i=1
[
σriri + σsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + σti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + σwi
1
ri
]
t =τ + τxx+ τvv +
q∑
i=1
[
τriri + τsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + τti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + τwi
1
ri
]
Similarly, each query mi is a linear combination of 1, x, v, r1, s1, t1, w1, . . ., ri−1,
si−1, ti−1, wi−1.
We will show that the signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure, i.e., an adversary
cannot construct a valid signature (R,S, T ) on M where the discrete logarithms
m, r, s, t satisfy the verification equations
sr = mv + x tr = sv + 1 = mv2 + xv + 1
unless it reuses M = Mj from a previous query.
If a randomization token has not been given for a particular message the
attacker must use τwi = 0 for all indices i where this message was queried. We
will show that the adversary can only randomize a signature by using some
τwj 6= 0. This means the signature scheme is strong for those messages where no
randomization token has been given, which gives us sEUF-CMA-TA security.
Our proof strategy is to use the first verification equation sr = mv + x to
simplify the descriptions of s and r by demonstrating that many of the coefficients
σ∗ and ρ∗ are 0. After narrowing the solution space down to four distinct cases,
we use the second verification equation tr = sv + 1 to rule out three cases and
determine a single type of possible solutions. These solutions correspond exactly
to randomization of signatures and if no randomization token is given then the
solution must be an exact copy of a previous signature.
In order to get to the core of our proof, we delay the proof of the following
claim.
Claim. The first verification equation sr = mv + x can only be satisfied if the
adversary picks σti = 0, σwi = 0, ρti = 0 and ρwi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , q.
We now know that σti , σwi , ρti and ρwi are zero for all i = 1, . . . , q. Obviously
we cannot rule out the existence of some j for which σsj 6= 0 since the adversary
could simply copy a previous signature s = sj by setting σsj = 1. We will now
analyze the structure of s and r when there exists a j such that σsj 6= 0.
We can write sr = mv + x as
(
σ + σxx+ σvv +
q∑
i=1
σriri + σsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
)
)
·
(
ρ+ ρxx+ ρvv +
q∑
i=1
ρriri + ρsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
)
)
=
(
µ+ µxx+ µvv +
q∑
i=1
µriri + µsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + µti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + µwi
1
ri
)
v + x.
We first look at the term x
2
r2j
. Observe that all verification key elements and signa-
tures are linear in x and therefore all elements m, r, s, t,m1, . . . ,mq constructed
using generic group operations must also be linear in x. This shows that the term
x2
r2j
has coefficient 0 in mv + x.
Let us now determine the coefficient of x
2
r2j
in the product sr. Whenever the
adversary makes a query mi to get a signature (ri, si, ti) the message mi is
multiplied by v or v2 by the signing oracle. It is not possible to decrease the
degree of v, so these queries cannot contribute to the x
2
r2j
term. Looking at the
terms in s and r we then see that the coefficient of x
2
r2j
in sr is σsjρsj .
Comparing the coefficients of x
2
r2j
from the two sides of the verification equation
we get σsjρrj = 0. Since we assumed σsj 6= 0 this implies ρsj = 0. Using a similar
analysis of the terms x
2
rirj
give us σsiρsj + σsjρsi = σsjρsi = 0 and therefore
ρsi = 0 for all i.
The term x
2
rj
gives us σsjρx = 0 and therefore ρx = 0. The term
x
rj
gives us
σsjρ = 0 and therefore ρ = 0. The terms
xri
rj
give us σsjρri = 0 and therefore
ρri = 0 for all i 6= j. Finally, the term x gives us σsjρrj = 1 and therefore
ρrj =
1
σsj
.
We now have r = ρvv + ρrjrj with ρrj =
1
σsj
6= 0. Let us proceed to analyze
the structure of s. The terms
xrj
ri
give us σsiρrj and therefore σsi = 0 for all
i 6= j. The term r2j gives us σrjρrj = 0 and therefore σrj = 0. The terms rirj
give us σriρrj + σrjρri = σriρrj = 0 and therefore σri = 0 for all i. The term
rj gives us σρrj = 0 and therefore σ = 0. The term xrj gives us σxρrj = 0 and
therefore σx = 0. We conclude that s = σvv + σsj (
mjv
rj
+ xrj ).
By symmetry we now have two possible cases:
Case s r
1 : σsj 6= 0 s = σvv + σsj (mjvrj + xrj ) r = ρvv + 1σsj rj
2 : ρsj 6= 0 s = σvv + 1ρsj rj r = ρvv + ρsj (
mjv
rj
+ xrj )
There still remains the possibility that σsi = 0 and ρsi = 0 for all i. We can
then write sr = mv + x as(
σ + σxx+ σvv +
q∑
i=1
σriri
)
·
(
ρ+ ρxx+ ρvv +
q∑
i=1
ρriri
)
=
(
µ+ µxx+ µvv +
q∑
i=1
µriri + µsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + µti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + µwi
1
ri
)
v + x.
The term x2 shows that ρxσx = 0, so they cannot both be non-zero. The term x
on the other hand shows σρx + σxρ = 1 so at least one of ρx or σx is non-zero.
Let us in the following assume σx 6= 0 and therefore ρ = 1σx 6= 0. The constant
term gives us σρ = 0 and therefore σ = 0. The terms ri give us σri = 0 for all i
and the terms xri give us ρri = 0 for all i. This means we have s = σxx+ σvv
and r = 1σxx+ ρvv. By symmetry we now have two additional cases
Case s r
3 : σx 6= 0 s = σxx+ σvv r = 1σx + ρvv
4 : ρx 6= 0 s = 1ρx + σvv r = ρxx+ ρvv
We will now analyze the four cases we have identified with the help of the
second verification equation tr = sv + 1. In case 4 where r = ρxx+ ρvv we see
that in tr all terms involve x or v. This means we do not have a constant term
in either tr or sv, which makes it impossible to get tr = sv + 1.
A similar argument can be used in case 2 where r = ρvv + ρsj (
mjv
rj
+ xrj ),
since both in tr and in sv all terms involve x or v and therefore it is impossible
to get tr = sv + 1.
Let us now analyze case 3 where r = ρ+ ρvv and s =
1
ρx+ σvv. We get(
τ + τxx+ τvv +
q∑
i=1
τriri + τsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + τti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + τwi
1
ri
)
· (ρ+ ρvv)
=
1
ρ
xv + σvv
2 + 1.
The constant term gives us τρ = 1 and therefore ρ = 1τ 6= 0. The term x gives us
τxρ = 0 and therefore τx = 0. But now the xv term yields a contradiction since
it gives us 0 = 1ρ 6= 0.
The only remaining possibility is case 1 where r = ρvv+ ρrjrj with ρrj =
1
σsj
and s = σvv + σsj (
mjv
rj
+ 1rj ). Inserting it in the second verification equation we
get(
τ + τxx+ τvv +
q∑
i=1
τriri + τsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + τti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + τwi
1
ri
)
· (ρvv + ρrjrj)
=σvv
2 + σsj (
mjv
2
rj
+
xv
rj
) + 1.
The terms
xvrj
r2i
give us τtiρrj = 0 and therefore τti = 0 for i 6= j. The terms
1
rirj
give us τwiρrj = 0 and therefore τwi = 0 for i 6= j. The terms xrjri give us
τsiρrj = 0 and therefore τsi = 0 for all i 6= j. The term x gives us τsjρrj = 0 and
therefore τsj = 0. The terms r
2
j and rirj give us τri = 0 for all i. The term xrj
gives us τx = 0 and the term rj gives us τ = 0.
Since ρrj =
1
σsj
we have now simplified the second verification equation to
(
τvv+τtj (
mjv
2
r2j
+
xv
r2j
+
1
rj
)+τwj
1
rj
)
·
(
ρvv+
1
σsj
rj
)
= σvv
2+σsj (
mjv
2
rj
+
xv
rj
)+1.
The term xvrj gives us τtj · 1σsj = σsj giving us τtj = σ
2
sj . The constant term gives
us (τtj + τwj ) · 1σsj = 1 giving us τwj = σsj (1−σsj ). The vrj term gives us τv = 0.
The xv
2
r2j
term gives us ρv = 0. Finally, the v
2 term gives us σv = 0.
The adversary can therefore only compute a valid signature by using
r =
1
σsj
rj s = σsjsj t = σ
2
sj tj + σsj (1− σsj )wj .
The first verification equation then gives us mv + x = sr = sjrj = mjv + x,
showing m = mj and therefore the signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure even in
the presence of randomization tokens. Furthermore, if no randomization token
wj has been provided for the message then τwj = 0. Since τwj = σsj (1−σsj ) and
σsj 6= 0 this shows σsj = 1. This implies r = rj , s = sj and t = tj , which shows
that the signature scheme is sEUF-CMA-TA secure.
Let us now prove Claim 3.
Proof. Starting with the first verification equation sr = mv + x we have(
σ + σxx+ σvv +
q∑
i=1
σriri + σsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + σti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + σwi
1
ri
)
·
(
ρ+ ρxx+ ρvv +
q∑
i=1
ρriri + ρsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + ρti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + ρwi
1
ri
)
=
(
µ+ µxx+ µvv +
q∑
i=1
µriri + µsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + µti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + µwi
1
ri
)
v + x
We first show that σti = 0 for all i. Assume for contradiction that there exists a
j such that σtj 6= 0. We start by looking at the coefficients of x
2v2
r4j
. The Laurent
polynomials corresponding to r, s,m and m1, . . . ,mq are all linear in x. Terms
involving x2 can therefore only arise in the product sr. This shows that the
coefficient of x
2v2
r4j
is 0 in mv + x. We will in the following argue the coefficient of
x2v2
r4j
in sr is σtjρtj , which by our assumption σtj 6= 0 implies ρtj = 0.
To see that indeed the coefficient of x
2v2
r4j
in sr is σtjρtj , we need to rule
out that other cross terms in sr can be x
2v2
r4j
. Observe that in all terms of s
and r the degree of rj ranges from −2 to 1 and only has degree -2 in the term
tj =
mjv
2
r2j
+ xv
r2j
+ 1rj and in subsequent signatures on queries mi that include a
tj term. However, if a term mi involves tj then the resulting signature terms si
and ti multiply the tj by v or v
2. By using the fact that the degree of v never
decreases, we see that all other cross terms involving x
2
r4j
have degree 3 or higher
in v. The coefficients of x
2v2
r4j
therefore do indeed give us σtjρtj = 0 and therefore
ρtj = 0.
Next we look at the term x
2v2
r2j r
2
i
for i 6= j. A similar analysis shows that the
coefficients satisfy σtjρti + σtiρtj = 0. Since ρtj = 0 and σtj 6= 0 this implies
ρti = 0 for all i.
We proceed to the term x
2v
r3j
and will show the coefficient in sr of this term is
σtjρsj . Since the degree of rj is -3 in the term, we see that tj must be used either
directly, or indirectly through a signature on a subsequent query mi involving
tj . However, whenever mi involves tj the degree of v is increased to at least 2
and such subsequent queries cannot contribute to the term. An inspection of the
different cross terms now shows that indeed σtjρsj is the coefficient in sr for the
term x
2v
r3j
. Since cross terms involving x2 can only arise in sr and not in mv + x
we then have σtjρsj = 0 and since we assumed σtj 6= 0 this means ρsj = 0.
A similar analysis shows that for i 6= j the terms x2v
rir2j
have coefficient
σtiρsj + σtjρsi = σtjρsi = 0 and therefore ρsi = 0 for all i.
We now look at the term x
2v
r2j
. Again looking at the degrees of v in subsequent
queries with mi using tj we see that they cannot contribute to the coefficient of
x2v
r2j
in sr and therefore the coefficient is σtjρx. Since there are no terms involving
x2 in mv + 1 this means σtjρx = 0 and therefore ρx = 0.
Using the term xv
r3j
we see that σtjρwj = 0 and therefore ρwj = 0. The terms
xv
rir2j
give us σtjρwi + σwiρtj = σtjρwi = 0, which implies ρwi = 0 for all i.
The term xv
r2j
gives us σtjρ = 0 and therefore ρ = 0.
The terms xvri
r2j
give us σtjρri = 0 and therefore ρri = 0 for all i 6= j. The
term xvrj gives us σtjρrj = 0 and therefore ρrj = 0.
We now have r = ρvv, which means all terms in sr and mv have at least
degree 1 in v. It is therefore impossible to get sr = mv + x when there exists a j
such that σtj 6= 0.
By symmetry we can also rule out the existence of ρtj 6= 0. We conclude that
both r and s must have ρti = 0 and σti = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , q and will use that
simplification in the rest of our proof.
Next, we will show that for all i we have σwi = 0. Assume for contradiction
σwj 6= 0 for some j. We can write sr = mv + x as(
σ + σxx+ σvv +
q∑
i=1
σriri + σsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + σwi
1
ri
)
·
(
ρ+ ρxx+ ρvv +
q∑
i=1
ρriri + ρsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + ρwi
1
ri
)
=
(
µ+ µxx+ µvv +
q∑
i=1
µriri + µsi(
miv
ri
+
x
ri
) + µti(
miv
2
r2i
+
xv
r2i
+
1
ri
) + µwi
1
ri
)
v + x.
The term 1
r2j
gives us σwjρwj = 0 since all other terms involving r
−2
j are multiplied
by powers of x or v. With σwj 6= 0 this means ρwj = 0. Similarly, the terms 1rirj
give us σwiρwj + σwjρwi = σwjρwi = 0 yielding ρwi = 0 for all i.
The term x
r2j
now gives us σwjρsj = 0 and therefore ρsj = 0. The terms
x
rirj
give us σwiρsj + σwjρsi = σwjρsi = 0 and therefore ρsi = 0 for all i.
The term 1rj gives us σwjρ = 0 and therefore ρ = 0. The term
x
rj
now gives
us σwjρx = 0 and therefore ρx = 0.
The constant term gives us σwjρrj = 0 and therefore ρrj = 0. The terms
ri
rj
give us σwjρri = 0 and therefore ρri = 0 for all i.
We now have r = ρvv giving us sr = ρvsv = mv + x. Since signing queries
only increase the degree of v this equation cannot be satisfied because of the x.
The contradiction leads us to conclude σwi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , q. By symmetry
this also shows ρwi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , q.
4 Optimal one-time signatures
The construction of a 3-element structure-preserving signature scheme in Sect. 3
leaves open the question whether 2-element one-time signatures exist. (A one-
time signature scheme with 3-element signatures already exists in the symmetric
setting [6]. It is sEUF-CMA under the simultaneous double-pairing assumption.)
We will now give a candidate for an sEUF-CMA secure one-time structure-
preserving signature scheme in the symmetric setting, which matches the 2-
element lower bound from Sect. 5. This one-time signature beats the 3-element
lower bound for general structure-preserving signatures in Theorem 5. Moreover,
the scheme is deterministic, so it also demonstrates that Lemma 1 requiring
general structure-preserving signatures to be randomized does not apply to
one-time signatures.
The case of one-time signatures also indicates a difference between the sym-
metric and the asymmetric Type III setting. Abe et al. [4] constructed a one-time
signature scheme with a single verification equation for messages belonging ex-
clusively to one of the groups G1 or G2 and in Sect. 4.1 we show that it is
even possible to make 1 element signatures in Type III groups. On the other
hand, there is no known structure-preserving (one-time) signature scheme in the
asymmetric setting for messages that contain groups elements in both G1 and
G2 with signature size less than 3.
The construction of our one-time signature is given in Fig. 2. We observe
that the verification key has two group elements V,W and the signer needs
to know the discrete logarithm of both of these elements. It is an interesting
question whether a 2-element structure-preserving one-time signature scheme can
be constructed with just a single variable verification key element like we did for
3-element signatures in Fig. 1, but we have some initial indications (not included
in this paper) that for some classes of one-time signature schemes this may not
be possible and that the signer needs to know at least two discrete logarithms.
Setup P(1k): Run (p,G,GT , e, G)← G(1k) and return PP = (p,G,GT , e, G).
Key generation K(PP): Choose v, w ← Zp and compute
V ← Gv, W ← Gw.
Return (V K, SK) = ((PP , V,W ), (PP , v, w)).
Signing SSK(M): Given M ∈ G, return the signature Σ = (S, T ) given by:
S = MvGw
2
, T = Sv.
Verification VVK(M, (S, T )): Accept if all the input elements are in G and if:
e(S,G) = e(M,V )e(W,W ) and e(T,G) = e(S, V ).
Fig. 2. One-time structure-preserving signature scheme in the symmetric setting.
Theorem 2. The scheme given in Fig. 2 is an sEUF-CMA secure one-time
signature scheme in the generic group model.
Proof. A generic adversary only uses generic group operations, which means
that in G it can only compute linear combinations on group elements from the
verification key or the signature from the one-time chosen message attack. We will
show that linear combinations of verification key elements and signature elements
correspond to formal polynomials (of degree 3 or less) in the corresponding discrete
logarithms of these elements and that no linear combinations will produce formal
polynomials corresponding to a forgery. By the master theorem in [11] this means
that the signature scheme is secure in the generic group model.
Suppose the adversary gets a one-time signature (S, T ) on a query M and
then outputs a valid signature (S∗, T ∗) on M∗. Since the adversary is generic
it computes M∗, S∗, T ∗ as linear combinations of G,V,W, S, T . This means the
discrete logarithms are of the form
m∗ = µ+ µvv + µww + µs(mv + w2) + µt(mv2 + w2v)
s∗ = σ + σvv + σww + σs(mv + w2) + σt(mv2 + w2v)
t∗ = τ + τvv + τww + τs(mv + w2) + τt(mv2 + w2v)
where m itself is a linear combination of 1, v, w.
The second verification equation t∗ = s∗v = m∗v2 + w2v gives us
τ + τvv + τww + τs(mv + w
2) + τt(mv
2 + w2v)
= µv2 + µvv
3 + µwwv
2 + µs(mv
3 + w2v2) + µt(mv
4 + w2v3) + w2v
The coefficients of w2v3 give us µt = 0. The coefficients of w
2v give us τt = 1.
The coefficients of w2 give us τs = 0. The coefficients of w
2v2 give us µs = 0.
The coefficients of 1, v, w give us τ = 0, τv = 0, τw = 0. This means mv
2 =
µv2 + µvv
3 + µwwv
2, which implies m = µ + µvv + µww = m
∗. Since the
verification equations uniquely determined the signature once the message is
fixed, m∗ = m implies s∗ = s and t∗ = t. This means (M∗, S∗, T ∗) = (M,S, T ),
which was the message and signature pair from the query. uunionsq
4.1 Optimal one-time signatures in the Type III setting
In Fig. 3, we present a one-time signature scheme over asymmetric bilinear groups
with single element signatures. It can be used to sign vectors of n group elements
in the second base group G2.
Setup P(1k): Return PP= (p,G1,G2,GT , e, G,H) generated by asymmetric bilin-
ear group generator G(1k).
Key generation K(PP): Choose v, a1, . . . , an ← Zp and compute:
V = Gv, A1 = G
a1 , . . . , An = G
an .
Return (V K, SK) = ((PP , V, A1, . . . , An), (PP , v, a1, . . . , an)).
Signing SSK(M): On inputM = (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Gn2 , return the signature:
S ← Hv
n∏
i=1
Maii .
Verification VVK((M1, . . . ,Mn), S): Accept if M1, . . . ,Mn, S ∈ G2 and if:
e(G,S) = e(V,H)
n∏
i=1
e(Ai,Mi).
Fig. 3. One-time structure-preserving signature with 1 element signatures in the Type III
setting.
Theorem 3. The scheme given in Fig. 3 is an sEUF-CMA secure one-time
signature in the generic group model.
Proof. A generic adversary can only compute linear combinations of group ele-
ments in the base groups, which means its signing query must be (M1, . . . ,Mn) =
(Hm1 , . . . ,Hmn) with known discrete logarithms m1, . . . ,mn. The generic adver-
sary gets a signature S = Hv+
∑n
i=1 aimi as response.
Suppose now the generic adversary computes a message (M∗1 , . . . ,M
∗
n) =
(Hm
∗
1 , . . . ,Hm
∗
n) and a valid signature S∗ = Hs
∗
. Since the adversary only uses
linear combinations of existing group elements it knows µ1, . . . , σs ∈ Zp such that
m∗j = µj + µs,j(v +
n∑
i=1
miai) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
s∗ = σ + σs(v +
n∑
i=1
miai).
The verification equation gives us s∗ = v +
∑n
i=1 aim
∗
i . This means:
(σs − 1)v = −σ − σs
n∑
j=1
mjaj +
n∑
j=1
µjaj +
n∑
j=1
µs,jaj(v +
n∑
i=1
miai).
It then holds that σs = 1, σ = 0, µj = mj and µs,j = 0 for all j. This means
m∗j = mj and s
∗ = s, so ((M∗1 , . . . ,M
∗
n), S
∗) = ((M1, . . . ,Mn), S), which is not
a valid forgery. uunionsq
5 Lower Bounds in the Symmetric Setting
We will show that in the Type I setting structure-preserving signatures must have
at least two verification equations and consist of at least three group elements.
This matches the lower bounds in the Type III setting [4]. One-time signature
can be just two group elements but still require two verification equations. Our
lower bounds hold even when the verification key may also include target group
elements Z ∈ GT , and the security is relaxed to random message attacks.
Theorem 4. (No one-equation signatures) The verification algorithm V
of a (one-time) EUF-RMA secure structure-preserving signature scheme over a
symmetric pairing group must evaluate at least two pairing product equations.
Proof. By diagonalizing the corresponding quadratic form, we may assume
without loss of generality that the single verification equation for a signature
Σ = (S1, . . . , Sn) on a one-element message M has the following form:
e(M,M)a · e(M,U
n∏
i=1
Sbii ) ·
n∏
i=1
e(Si, Si)
ci · e(Si, Vi) = Z. (1)
Let us fix an arbitrary message M ∈ G and a signature Σ = (S1, . . . , Sn) on M
which is valid with respect to the verification equation (1). We will construct
an explicity forgery (M∗, Σ∗) such that Σ∗ coincides with Σ on all components
except one. We distinguish between two cases: either all the coefficients ci in the
verification equation (1) are nonzero or at least one of the ci’s is zero.
Case 1: ci 6= 0 for all i. We first assume that all the ci’s are nonzero, and fix an
arbitrary index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. LetM be any message andΣ = (S1, . . . , Sn) a valid
signature on M . We concentrate on the component S = Si of Σ, and claim that we
can find a pair (M∗, S∗) 6= (M,S) such that Σ∗ = (S1, . . . , Si−1, S∗, Si+1, . . . , Sn)
is a valid signature on M∗. In terms of discrete logarithms, this is equivalent to
finding (m∗, s∗) 6= (m, s) such that:
am2 + m(u + bs + k) + cs2 + sv = am∗2 + m∗(u + bs + k) + cs∗2 + s∗v (2)
where we let b = bi, c = ci, V = Vi, and K =
∏
j 6=i S
bj
j . To find such a pair, we
look for m∗, s∗ of the form:
m∗ = µ0u+ µ1v + (1 + µ2)m+ µ3s+ µ4k,
s∗ = σ0u+ σ1v + σ2m+ (1 + σ3)s+ σ4k.
such that equation (2) is satisfied regardless of the discrete logarithms, i.e. such
that the corresponding coefficients of the left-hand side and right-hand side of
equation (2), when regarded as polynomials in Zp[u, v,m, s, k], are pairwise equal.
This gives a quadratic system of 15 equations in the 10 unknowns µ0, . . . , µ4,
σ0, . . . , σ4, which we solve by computing a Gro¨bner basis of the corresponding
ideal. We obtain, in particular, a rational one-parameter family of solutions. Let
ω be any element in Zp such that τ = b2 − 4ac− ω2 6= 0. Then the following is a
solution:
(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) = 2/τ ·
(
2c, ω − b, bω − δ, 2cω, 2c)
(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) = (ω − b)/(cτ) ·
(
2c, ω − b, bω − δ, 2cω, 2c)
(where δ = b2 − 4ac) and defines corresponding group elements (M∗ω, S∗ω).
This is a successful forgery provided that we can find some ω such that
M 6= M∗ω. Suppose that this is not the case. Then for all ω such that τ 6= 0, we
must have:
M∗ω ·M−1 = Uµ0 · V µ1 ·Mµ2 · Sµ3 ·Kµ4 = 1.
By raising to the power τ/2, this gives:
U2cV ω−bM bω−b
2+4acS2cωK2c =
(
VM bS2c
)ω · (U2cV −bM−b2+4acK2c) = 1,
and since this relation is verified for all ω ∈ Zp except at most two values, this
implies in particular that VM bS2c = 1, or in other words S = V −1/2c ·M−b/2c.
Now recall that all the ci’s are nonzero. By the previous argument, we can either
carry out the previous attack for at least one index i, or the signature on a
message M must be given, with overwhelming probability, by Σ = (S1, . . . , Sn)
where Si = V
−1/2ci
i ·M−bi/2ci for all i, which is obviously insecure.
Case 2: ci = 0 for some i. Suppose ci = 0 for some i. We concentrate on that
index like before, and look again for a forgery (M∗, S∗) given a signature Σ on an
arbitrary message M . With the same notation as before, we find a one-parameter
family (M∗ω, S
∗
ω) of solutions, given by:
(µ0, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4) = −ω/(bω + 1) ·
(
0, 1, b, 0, 0
)
(σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) = ω ·
(
1,−aω/(bω + 1), a(bω + 2)/(bω + 1), b, 1)
for all ω such that bω + 1 6= 0. This gives a forgery unless M∗ω = M for all such
ω, namely (VM b)−ω/(bω+1) = 1. As a result, we get a forgery on any message
except V −1/b (or any message if b = 0). This completes the proof. uunionsq
Corollary 1. (Two group elements required for one-time signatures.)
A structure-preserving one-time signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable
against a one-time random message attack must have at least 2 group elements.
Proof. Suppose there is a scheme where a signature is a single group element S.
If a linear combination of the verification equations give us a non-trivial equation
that is linear in S, then this equation uniquely determines S and we can just
use this equation as the verification equation instead of all the other verification
equations. If there is no linear combination of the verification equations that yield
a non-trivial linear equation in S then they must all be linearly dependent and
we can again reduce to the case where there is a single verification equation. uunionsq
For structure-preserving signatures where the adversary can ask multiple
signature queries there is a stronger lower bound of 3 group elements.4
Theorem 5. (Three group elements required for structure-preserving
signatures.) A structure-preserving signature scheme with a generic signer that
is existentially unforgeable against random message attacks must have at least 3
group elements.
Proof. We begin by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A structure-preserving signature scheme with a generic signer that is
existentially unforgeable against random message attacks must for each message
have a superpolynomial number of potential signatures.
Proof. Suppose that for a message M there are only polynomially many signature
vectors Σ. Since the signer is generic this means there is a polynomial set
{(→α,
→
β )}poly(k)i=1 of vectors in Znp creating signature vectors Σ = G
→
αM
→
β by entry-
wise exponentiation. Given signatures Σ0 and Σ1 on random messages M0 and
4 Our proof of the lower bound is much simpler than the proof for the similar lower
bound of 3 group elements in [4] in the asymmetric Type III setting and can with
minor modifications be adapted to Type III groups. More generally, the proof of
Theorem 5 indicates that in general if there are m verification equations, then the
signature size needs to be m+ 1.
M1 we have
1
poly(k)2 probability that they are constructed with the same (
→
α,
→
β )
pair. In that case
Σ∗ = Σr0Σ
1−r
1 = G
→
α (Mr0M
1−r
1 )
→
β
is a signature on M∗ = Mr0M
1−r
1 for all r ∈ Zp. uunionsq
Now suppose that we have an SPS with just two group elements (S, T ) and a
minimal number of verification equations. We know there must be at least two
verification equations. This means the discrete logarithms s, t of the signature
elements must satisfy two quadratic equations. By using a linear combination of
the two verification equations, we can without loss of generality ensure the first
equation is linear in t, i.e., t = as2 + bs+ c for some a, b, c ∈ Zp determined by
the message and the verification key. We can then substitute this into the second
verification equation to get a quartic equation in s. If the equation is non-trivial,
then there are at most 4 solutions for s and therefore at most 4 signatures in
total contradicting Lemma 1. On the other hand if the equation is trivial, then
the second verification equation was redundant and could be eliminated, which
contradicts our initial assumption that we had a minimal number of verification
equations. uunionsq
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